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NOTES
MODERN DAY SCHOOL SEGREGATION:
EQUITY, EXCELLENCE, & EQUAL
PROTECTION
DANIELLE KASTEN†
“The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is
that too often it does.” 1

INTRODUCTION
“You can tell right away, just by looking into a classroom, what
level it is.”2
“[W]atching this flow of bodies in and out of your classroom.
One flow comes in, and everyone is black . . . another set of
bodies flow in and they’re largely white . . . [I]t is undeniable,
what you see. You know something is going on.”3

†
Managing Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., summa cum laude, 2013, St.
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2010, Rutgers College, Rutgers University. I
am immensely grateful to Professor Adam Zimmerman for his invaluable guidance
and advice. I would also like to extend a very special thank you to Cris Thorne for
his patience, support, and love, throughout the writing process, law school, and
beyond. Finally, I want to acknowledge the incredible teachers of the South
Orange/Maplewood School District—my very own segregated school district—who
inspired me early and often, taught me to think critically, and encouraged me to
fight for what I believe in. I would like to especially thank Mr. Jon Campbell, Dr.
Melissa Cooper, and the late Ms. Carolyn Johnson, may she rest in peace.
1
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
2
Jeffrey Gettleman, The Segregated Classrooms of a Proudly Diverse School,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, at 1.31 (quoting a student from Columbia High School, in
Maplewood, New Jersey).
3
Interview by Cristopher Thorne with Dr. Melissa Cooper, Teacher, Columbia
High Sch., in Maplewood, N.J. (Nov. 17, 2011) (emphasis added).
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The “something” that is going on is academic tracking.4 The
system it creates is separate5 and explicitly unequal. And it is a
method of student placement that is more likely to be used in a
diverse district than in a district that is either exclusively white
or exclusively black.6 In short, it is a system of within-school
segregation,7 and it is used pervasively throughout this country’s
schools.8 Yet to date, courts have only inconsistently found that
academic tracking constitutes a violation of Equal Protection.9
Academic tracking “is the educational practice of
categorizing students by curriculum.”10 The practice involves
separating students—ostensibly on the basis of “ability”—into
different “tracks,” “levels,” or “groups,” with distinct or
differentially paced curriculums. The typical model involves
three tracks: (1) “slow or vocational”; (2) “average or general”;
and (3) “fast or academic.”11 In most districts that track,
students are placed based on a combination of three criteria:
(1) standardized test scores; (2) “teacher and counselor
recommendations (including grades)”; and (3) “students’ and
their parents’ choices.”12 While this practice is facially raceneutral, its effect is not. When tracking is employed in a diverse
district, students become racially segregated, with white
students being placed disproportionately in “fast or academic”
tracks and students of color being largely relegated to “slow or
vocational” tracks.13
4

See id.
See Gettleman, supra note 2.
6
Peter G. VanderHart, Why Do Some Schools Group by Ability? Some Evidence
from the NAEP, 65 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 435, 449 (2006).
7
See id. at 457; see also People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 851 F. Supp.
905, 917 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
8
CAROL CORBETT BURRIS & DELIA T. GARRITY, DETRACKING FOR EXCELLENCE
AND EQUITY vii (2008).
9
Compare Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d
1403, 1412, 1429 (11th Cir. 1985), with People Who Care, 851 F. Supp. at 933.
10
C. Anne Broussard & Alfred L. Joseph, Tracking: A Form of Educational
Neglect?, 20 SOC. WORK EDUC. 110, 111 (1998).
11
Id. The specific form of academic tracking with which this Note takes issue is
that which classifies students into at least two tracks and which separates students
of different tracks into different classrooms.
12
JEANNIE OAKES, KEEPING TRACK: HOW SCHOOLS STRUCTURE INEQUALITY 9
(2d ed. 2005). Different schools may weigh the three categories differently, placing
greater emphasis on test scores, grades, or other criteria. Id.
13
See Angelia Dickens, Note, Revisiting Brown v. Board of Education: How
Tracking Has Resegregated America’s Public Schools, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
469, 473–74 (1996).
5
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Few people would argue that academic tracking does not
have a racially disproportionate impact.
However,
disproportionate impact alone is not enough to make out an
Equal Protection violation.14 The Supreme Court has drawn a
firm distinction between de jure and de facto discrimination.15
The former describes discrimination that results from intentional
state action,16 while the latter refers to racially disproportionate
impacts that are the result of circumstances over which the state
has no control.17 Under existing Supreme Court precedent, only
de jure discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause.18
As a result, current legal challenges to tracking have met
with inconsistent results.
Rather than address the
constitutionality of academic tracking generally, courts have
decided its constitutionality on a district-by-district basis.19
Moreover, different courts have judged its constitutionality under
different legal standards. Under the McNeal standard, for
instance, academic tracking systems only constitute de jure
segregation where the district can demonstrate neither that the
segregative effect is not the result of past segregation nor that
the tracking system will remedy the detrimental effects of past
segregation.20 Other courts have found that academic tracking
constitutes de jure segregation when plaintiffs can establish that
the district acted with the purpose or intent to segregate.21 While
academic scholars have proposed more broad-based challenges to
tracking, those challenges have either relied on statutory relief or
advanced Equal Protection approaches that rest on shaky
precedential ground.22
This Note argues that, under existing Supreme Court
precedent, academic tracking constitutes de jure segregation. It
further contends that academic tracking systems need not be
analyzed on a district-by-district basis because—in light of their
14

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
See id. at 240.
16
Id.
17
See NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1049 (6th Cir. 1977).
18
See Davis, 426 U.S. at 240.
19
See McNeal v. Tate Cnty. Sch. Dist., 508 F.2d 1017, 1019–20 (5th Cir. 1975);
People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 851 F. Supp. 905, 912, 1001 (N.D. Ill.
1994); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 406–07 (D.D.C. 1967), aff’d sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
20
McNeal, 508 F.2d at 1020.
21
See, e.g., People Who Care, 851 F. Supp. at 1001.
22
See infra Part II.C.2.
15
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unique history—wherever an academic tracking system creates
within school segregation, it is per se unconstitutional. Part I of
this Note analyzes the unique history of academic tracking,
drawing parallels between academic tracking systems and
segregation explicitly mandated by law. Part II outlines current
Equal Protection doctrine both generally and within the unique
context of schools, and explores how that doctrine has been
applied to academic tracking cases. Finally, Part III reanalyzes
the application of Equal Protection doctrine to academic tracking,
ultimately concluding that, when properly analyzed under
existing precedent, academic tracking constitutes de jure
segregation and is therefore unconstitutional.
I.

THE RACIALIZED HISTORY OF ACADEMIC TRACKING SYSTEMS

From its inception, academic tracking has been a racialized
practice. This Part demonstrates the inextricable link between
academic tracking and race. Section A reviews the origins of
tracking practices and, in so doing, demonstrates that the same
reasoning that supported explicit racial segregation has been
used to justify academic tracking. Section B establishes that the
explicit assumptions about racialized-ability that supported
tracking at its inception continue to pervade modern academic
tracking discourse.
A.

The Birth of Academic Tracking

From some of its earliest appearances in legal text, the
concept of segregating students on the basis of race was
intimately tied to concepts of ability.23 Almost fifty years before
the Supreme Court condoned the doctrine of “separate but
equal,”24 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld
Boston’s use of a dual school system for black and white
children.25 The Court granted the school committee broad
discretion to “arrange, classify, and distribute pupils, in such a
manner as they think best adapted to their general proficiency
and welfare.”26 So long as the school committee exercised that
23
Note, Teaching Inequality: The Problem of Public School Tracking, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1318, 1321 (1989).
24
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25
Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 209 (1849).
26
Id. at 208 (emphasis added); see also Note, supra note 23.
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discretion “reasonably” and there was no showing that it had
“abused” its authority, its decision that separation on the basis of
race was “adapted” to the students’ “general proficienc[ies]” was
not open to further judicial scrutiny.27
Later, in People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, the New York
Court of Appeals drew on the principle of school authority
discretion when it upheld Brooklyn’s racially segregated school
system against an Equal Protection challenge.28 The court
explicitly based its holding on the idea that “[a] natural
distinction exists between the[] races,”29 noting that “legislation
which recognizes th[ose] distinction[s] and provides for the
peculiar wants or conditions of the particular race can in no just
sense be called a discrimination.”30 In discussing the “natural
distinction[s]” between the races, the court was not commenting
merely on skin color; rather, the court was noting the wellaccepted notion that students of color were intellectually inferior
to Anglo-Saxon white students.31
By condoning racial
segregation, then, these early cases were implicitly condoning the
separation of students into different schools on the basis of
perceived ability.32
These notions of innate racial inferiority and superiority
coincided with the invention of the first intelligence test, which
led to the formal adoption of racialized-ability grouping.33 Alfred
Binet developed the first intelligence test in France in 1904 as a
way “to identify ‘children whose poor performance indicated a
need for special education.’ ”34 Although Binet’s purpose was to
use the test to measure achievement,35 “testing was quickly
adopted by scientists in the United States who believed the tests

27
Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 208, 209 (“The committee, apparently upon
great deliberation, have come to the conclusion, that the good of both classes of
schools will be best promoted, by maintaining the separate primary schools for
colored and for white children, and we can perceive no ground to doubt, that this is
the honest result of their experience and judgment.”).
28
See People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 441–42, 445, 450 (1883).
29
Id. at 450 (emphasis added).
30
Id.
31
See id.; see also Note, supra note 23.
32
Gallagher, 93 N.Y. at 450; Note, supra note 23.
33
Note, supra note 23, at 1322.
34
Id. (quoting STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 152 (1981)).
35
See id.
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could measure innate intelligence.”36
Thus, the American
scientists who imported IQ tests erroneously conflated academic
performance with innate intelligence.37
It is in this historical context that the results of such exams
began to be used to create a coherent educational system based
on ability and stratified by race.38 Lewis Terman, the man
credited with importing the use of IQ testing to America, “urg[ed]
the use of ability grouping to keep certain ethnic groups
separated from Anglo-Americans in school.”39 This promotion of
testing as a means to identify innate abilities led to a significant
shift in the way students were organized in schools, as school
authorities “beg[a]n sorting students into separate tracks based
on initial assessments of their capacity to learn.”40 The concept of
academic tracking was therefore born of the belief that races of
people were biologically distinct groups with differing innate
ability levels and that they should be separated in schools
accordingly.41
Moreover, in establishing ability grouping, assumptions were
made not only about students’ innate abilities to learn, but also
about where those “natural” capabilities positioned them in the
larger economic and social hierarchy of American society.42
Proponents of academic tracking believed that students’

36

See id.
Id.
38
Daniel J. Losen, Note, Silent Segregation in Our Nation’s Schools, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 517, 520 (1999).
39
Id. at 521; see also R.C. Lewontin et al., IQ: The Rank Ordering of the World,
in THE “RACIAL” ECONOMY OF SCIENCE: TOWARD A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE 142, 144
(Sandra Harding ed., 1993) (quoting Lewis Terman as writing that “[c]hildren of
[Spanish-Indian, Mexican, and negro families] should be segregated into special
classes. . . . They cannot master abstractions, but they can often be made efficient
workers. . . . There is no possibility at present of convincing society that they should
not be allowed to reproduce, although from a eugenic point of view they constitute a
grave problem because of their unusually prolific breeding”).
40
Note, supra note 23, at 1322 (“Testing experts did not seriously consider the
possibility that differences between racial groups might be the result of
environmental factors or cultural bias in the tests. Instead, accepting the
widespread assumption that native whites were at the top of society because of their
superior racial stock, they interpreted test results as reflecting innate capacity.”).
41
See id.
42
Dickens, supra note 13, at 471. In the early twentieth century the goal of
education was to prepare students “to assume different roles in the socioeconomic
hierarchy,” and tracking was seen as preparing students for occupations tailored to
their “innate ability to learn.” Id.
37
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occupational choices were limited by their “innate” abilities.43
“They explicitly rejected an alternative vision of education
premised on the belief that all students had the potential to
comprehend material necessary to pursue higher education.”44
Thus, embedded in the very foundation of the tracking system is
the premise that only those “high-ability” students should be
educated for the purpose of attending post-secondary schools,
while “low-ability” students need only be prepared for vocational
occupations.45
The education of black children was explicitly geared
towards vocations under this system.46 Remedial and vocational
education was considered most appropriate for minorities and
immigrants, while college preparatory courses were considered
appropriate for Anglo-American whites.47 In this way, early
proponents of academic tracking created it with the express
intent to stratify economically based on racialized notions of
ability, which paralleled what contemporary science viewed as
the “natural” positions of the races.48
Thus, from the inception of the system, tracking has been a
racialized practice.49 But rather than being consciously viewed
as oppressive by those who instituted tracking systems, the
racial undertones were seen as resulting from the “innate
inferiority” of black children and were perceived to adhere to the
natural racial order.50 These assumptions about racial hierarchy
informed the very structure of ability grouping, and these notions
of “racial inferiority” became embedded in the system itself.51

43

Id.
Note, supra note 23, at 1327–28.
45
Dickens, supra note 13, at 471 (acknowledging that “advanced placement
classes prepared students for college and careers that required specialized
professional training,” while “[r]emedial and vocational programs prepared students
for low-skill jobs or for technical training”).
46
Terry Kershaw, The Effects of Educational Tracking on the Social Mobility of
African Americans, 23 J. BLACK STUD. 152, 157 (1992).
47
Dickens, supra note 13.
48
See Note, supra note 23, at 1322–23.
49
See Dickens, supra note 13, at 473.
50
See Note, supra note 23, at 1322–23.
51
See Dickens, supra note 13.
44
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Tracking: Death and Resurrection

Despite massive initial support, tracking began to fall out of
widespread use after the 1930s.52 Interest in academic tracking
diminished in light of studies “indicat[ing] grouping by ability
had little or no effect on achievement gains.”53 As research
demonstrating that “low placements could have negative effects
on students” gained credibility between the mid-1930s to mid1950s, the use of tracking declined—but only for a brief period.54
Academic tracking was reintroduced on a mass scale in
direct response to the changing legal status of race-relations in
the United States in the mid-1950s. In 1954, Brown v. Board of
Education ruled the doctrine of “separate but equal”
unconstitutional in the public school setting.55 Following the
Supreme Court’s ruling, academic tracking again increased
dramatically.56 The resurgence of academic tracking minimized
the effects of integration and continued to keep Anglo-American
white students and students of color separate.57
Moreover, there is evidence indicating that tracking was
intentionally used as a segregative tool. The belief that students
of color had inferior innate intellectual abilities persisted into the
1960s.58 In fact, the belief was so strongly held that legislators in
at least one state considered passing a resolution “that would
support a contention that Negroes are inferior to whites in innate
ability and that therefore segregation is scientifically
supportable.”59 Another state made the study of a book teaching
52

Losen, supra note 38, at 521.
Id.
54
Note, supra note 23, at 1323.
55
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Dickens, supra
note 13, at 472.
56
Dickens, supra note 13, at 472 (noting that “[t]he Brown decision is directly
correlated with the re-introduction of tracking as a system of academic
classification”); Losen, supra note 38, at 521.
57
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 457 (D.D.C. 1967), aff’d sub nom. Smuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see McNeal v. Tate Cnty. Sch. Dist., 508
F.2d 1017, 101819 (5th Cir. 1975). In the South, tracking was used “as a means of
circumventing court-ordered desegregation,” Losen, supra note 38, at 521, while in
the North, tracking was used in response to demographic changes that resulted in
increasing minority student populations, particularly in large urban centers, Note,
supra note 23, at 1323.
58
See Joseph A. Loftus, Virginia Debates Negro Abilities: Legislature To Vote on
Book Branding Race Inferior, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1962, at 62. See generally
CARLETON PUTNAM, RACE AND REASON: A YANKEE VIEW (1961).
59
Loftus, supra note 58.
53
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racial inferiority compulsory in its state schools.60 That those
notions of racialized-ability were part of the mainstream antiintegration discourse at the same time that tracking was being
reintroduced calls into serious question the race-neutrality of
tracking’s resurgence. Because tracking’s proponents believed so
strongly that ability differs by race, their racial intentions in
separating by ability are clear.
Nor has the discourse on racialized-ability disappeared from
the American mainstream.61 Rather, it has simply shifted form.62
Perhaps nowhere are racialized conceptions of ability more
evident than in those diverse communities that have attempted
to detrack,63 where the parents of white, upper-track students
almost invariably challenge educators’ attempts to detrack on the
grounds that increasing diversity will negatively impact
academic rigor.64 As one educator put it, “statements that
contain racial or class biases will be coded, but everyone in the
room will know what is being said and what is feared.”65
Community members may juxtapose “minority students” with
“high achieving students,” as though the two terms are mutually
exclusive.66 Or they may use racially neutral terms, like “some,”
“other,” or “demographics,” to make implications that are
nonetheless racialized in context.67 Other times, they will

60

Id.
OAKES, supra note 12, at 272 (finding that “[s]tereotypical views of minority
students’ ability and motivation for academic work . . . remained salient in schools
and communities”).
62
As late as 1994, the authors of The Bell Curve explicitly argued that ability is
inherited and racially distributed. See generally RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES
A. MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN
LIFE (1994). While such blatantly racialized arguments have become less socially
acceptable, the book’s widespread readership demonstrates that support for notions
of racialized-ability have not disappeared from the American consciousness. The Bell
Curve was a New York Times Best Seller for at least fourteen weeks. The New York
Times Book Review: Best Sellers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1995, at BR26.
63
“Detracking” refers to the process of eliminating tracking from schools. See
BURRIS & GARRITY, supra note 8, at viii.
64
OAKES, supra note 12, at 287; see also Rusty Reeves, Deleveling Doesn’t
Narrow Racial Lines, NEWS-REC., Jan. 12, 2012, at 5 (commenting that “[w]ith
deleveling, we are lowering educational standards”).
65
BURRIS & GARRITY, supra note 8, at 62.
66
See, e.g., Reeves, supra note 64 (“[The district superintendent] says we have
an educational ‘debt’ to pay black children. The high achieving children will pay that
debt.”) (emphasis added).
67
See, e.g., OAKES, supra note 12, at 273 (recounting one educator’s comment
that “[w]e’re getting fewer honors kids, and that’s just demographics”).
61
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suggest that diversity—while a laudable goal—is incompatible
with excellence.68 Community members opposed to tracking
frequently claim that different cultural backgrounds and
differing abilities are responsible for the disproportionate
numbers of minority students in lower tracks,69 and that these
factors are “outside the purview of the school.”70
Yet the research consistently shows that tracking itself
significantly contributes to the racialized-achievement gap. In
fact, districts that have detracked have dramatically narrowed
the achievement gap between white and minority students in
their districts.71 And research in districts that continue to track
has demonstrated that—even in the present day—race, and not
ability or achievement, is often the defining factor in track
placement.72 So why, in the twenty-first century, do schools
continue to track, despite such evidence? One junior high school
teacher put it this way: “Quite frankly, I think the reason we
have honors is parental pressure. It’s a racial issue. An honors
group is a white group.”73
The current legal status of academic tracking cannot be
analyzed in a vacuum. Rather, it must be analyzed in light of its
history and with reference to the beliefs about racialized-ability
that motivated—and continue to motivate—its use. This brief
history of academic tracking, then, illustrates two key points:
(1) for at least the first fifty years of its existence, the use of
academic tracking rested on explicit assumptions about
racialized-ability—assumptions that continue to pervade
American racial discourse; and, (2) the use of academic tracking,
both at its birth and at its resurrection, was intimately connected
with the use of racial segregation.
68
See Kevin Thompson, Deleveling, Think Globally Before Acting Locally,
NEWS-REC., Jan. 19, 2012, at 4 (“Celebrating our diversity at the expense of our
competitiveness will doom our kids to frustration and failure. Now, more than ever,
we need to challenge each student to the limits of his or her abilities . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
69
BURRIS & GARRITY, supra note 8, at 20.
70
Thompson, supra note 68 (“Yes, there are achievement-gap issues that need
to be addressed. However, many of these stem from a variety of factors that are
outside the purview of the school.”).
71
See BURRIS & GARRITY, supra note 8, at 12–13.
72
OAKES, supra note 12, at 233 (finding that in three different school districts,
“African American and Latino students were more likely than their white and Asian
peers with the same test scores to be placed in low-track classes”).
73
Id. at 266.
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II. EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO TRACKING
This Part analyzes the Equal Protection challenges that
have been made to the practice of academic tracking. Section A
gives a brief overview of Supreme Court Equal Protection
doctrine.
Section B then examines the Supreme Court’s
approach to Equal Protection claims in the context of education
generally. Finally, Section C examines the way Equal Protection
doctrine has been applied in a number of tracking cases.
A.

Supreme Court Equal Protection Doctrine

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part: “No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”74
The Equal Protection Clause’s basic guarantee is that “all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”75
However, courts recognize that not all state classifications are
constitutionally inappropriate, and they generally give states
broad discretion to determine who is and who is not “similarly
circumstanced.”76 Thus, for most types of state action, the
Supreme Court has held that the state need only show that the
challenged classification “rationally furthers a legitimate state
purpose.”77 This relatively deferential standard78 is known as
“rational-basis review.”79
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court will not extend this level of
deference to the states where certain types of classifications are
involved.80 Rather, it has subjected “those classifications that
disadvantage a ‘suspect class,’ or that impinge upon the exercise
of a ‘fundamental right’ ”81 to a heightened form of review known
as strict scrutiny.82 Where state action does implicate either a
“suspect class” or a “fundamental right,” the Court will “requir[e]
74

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
76
See id.
77
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
78
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216.
79
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
738 (2007).
80
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216.
81
Id. at 216–17.
82
Id. at 217 n.15.
75
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the State to demonstrate that its classification has been precisely
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”83 The
Court has reserved the title of “suspect class” for only those
“discrete and insular”84 groups that “command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process.”85 Among
others, the categories of “race,” “national origin,” and “alienage”
have been deemed “suspect classes.”86 Similarly, the Court has
limited those rights that can be classified as “fundamental” and
therefore deserving of strict scrutiny.87 To determine whether an
infringed right rises to the status of a “fundamental” right, the
Court “look[s] to the Constitution to see if the right . . . has its
source, explicitly or implicitly, therein.”88 The right to vote, the
right to interstate travel, the right to procreate, and other rights
of a “uniquely private nature” are among those that have been
granted “fundamental rights” protection.89
Generally, if the state action implicates neither a “suspect
class” nor a “fundamental right,” the Court will apply rational
basis review.90
Occasionally, however, the Court has
acknowledged that certain state classifications, while not
specifically affecting a “suspect class” nor impinging on a
“fundamental right,” nonetheless implicate Equal Protection
issues deserving of a level of scrutiny that exceeds mere rational
review.91 Under this standard, referred to as “intermediate
scrutiny,”92 the Court determines “whether [the classification at
issue] may fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial interest of
the State.”93 The Court subjects particular classifications to this
standard to ensure that they “reflect[] a reasoned judgment
consistent with the ideal of equal protection.”94 However, the
83

Id. at 216–17.
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
85
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); see also
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14 (“Legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups
disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of ‘class
or caste’ treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.”);
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313.
86
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 61.
87
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217 n.15.
88
Id.
89
Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312 & n.3.
90
See id. at 312–14.
91
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217–18.
92
Id. at 218 n.16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
93
Id. at 217–18.
94
Id. at 217.
84
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Court rarely applies this level of scrutiny.95 Thus, in the vast
majority of Equal Protection challenges where neither an
acknowledged “suspect class” nor “fundamental right” is at issue,
the Court will apply rational basis review.
At least where Equal Protection challenges on the basis of
race are concerned, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction
between de jure and de facto discrimination, adding yet another
layer of inquiry to the analysis.96 Race is a “suspect class,” and a
law that discriminates by race on its face will be subject to strict
scrutiny.97 On the other hand, where a law is facially neutral,
but nonetheless is alleged to have a disproportionate impact on
individuals of a particular race, the law will not automatically be
subject to strict scrutiny.98 While a facially neutral law still is
not permitted “invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race,”99
a disproportionate impact only presents a constitutional violation
where it is the result of intentional state action.100 The plaintiffs
in such a case bear the initial burden of establishing
discriminatory intent.101 Once that burden is met, “the burden of
proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of
unconstitutional action.”102 Only if the state fails to successfully
rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action will the Court
apply strict scrutiny; where the state effectively rebuts the
presumption, the Court will merely apply rational basis
review.103
Equal Protection in the Public Schools104

B.

In the context of public education, the Court’s Equal
Protection analysis has been even more nuanced. Since the
Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Brown v. Board of
95

See id. at 218 n.16.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240, 242 (1976).
97
See id. at 242.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 241.
100
See id. at 239.
101
See id. at 240–41.
102
Id. at 241 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
103
See id. at 242, 246.
104
This Note does not purport to offer an exhaustive analysis of either all
education-related Equal Protection claims or even all issues within the cases
discussed herein. This Note confines itself to analysis of those cases and issues that
bear directly on race, ability, and education. Specifically, issues such as whether
wealth constitutes a “suspect class” are beyond the scope of this Note.
96
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Education,105 two distinct lines of cases have developed. The first
line of cases can generally be characterized as involving
allegations of state- or district-imposed racial segregation.106
This line is addressed in Subsection 1. The second line of cases
involves various allegations that a facially neutral state law or
policy, while not resulting in segregation, is nonetheless
constitutionally invalid because it denies some class of students
equal protection of the laws.107 That line is discussed in
Subsection 2. Finally, Subsection 3 briefly emphasizes the
distinction between those two lines of cases, as that distinction is
critical to understanding both the current case law on academic
tracking and the current legal critiques of academic tracking
systems.
For more than fifty years preceding the Court’s decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, school systems throughout the
country were explicitly segregated on the basis of race pursuant
to the doctrine of “separate but equal.”108 According to that
doctrine, states or school districts could operate segregated school
systems so long as the facilities provided to black and white
students were “equal.”109 In Brown I, the Court was faced for the
first time with the question of whether separate educational
facilities can ever actually be “equal”; in other words, the Court
had to decide whether racial segregation in the public schools
constitutes a per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause.110
In the Court’s now-famous holding, Chief Justice Warren
announced that it does:
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of
‘separate but equal’ has no place.
Separate educational
facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the

105

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526, 530 (1979);
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 452 (1979); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189, 191 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
5–6 (1971).
107
See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 452 (1988); Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17
(1973).
108
Brown I, 347 U.S. at 490–91; see also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544–
46 (1896), overruled by Brown I, 347 U.S. 483.
109
See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950).
110
See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493.
106
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plaintiffs and others similarly situated . . . are, by reason of the
segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.111

This holding created the foundation for two distinct lines of
Equal Protection cases in the public school context.
1.

The Supreme Court’s School Segregation Line

The first line of cases followed directly from the Court’s
explicit holding in Brown I—that is, that segregation constitutes
a per se violation of Equal Protection.112 The legal implication of
the Court’s holding for laws explicitly mandating segregation was
obvious: The laws were constitutionally invalid.113 However,
cases in which school segregation was not imposed explicitly by
law—but rather as the result of other, facially race-neutral, state
or school district policies—quickly began to make their way up to
the Supreme Court.114 Through these cases, the Court began to
develop a doctrine under which to analyze at what point policies
that create segregation-in-fact rise to the level of
unconstitutional segregation-by-law.
The first cases to reach the Supreme Court dealt with
continuing segregation in school districts that had been explicitly
segregated prior to Brown I.115 Pursuant to Brown II, such
districts were under “an affirmative duty ‘to effectuate a
transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system.’ ”116
Immediately after Brown II, however, it was unclear whether
that transition could be accomplished merely by abolishing laws
requiring separate schools, or whether those districts were also
required to take further steps to desegregate.
111

Id. at 495.
See id.
113
See id. The companion case to Brown I, Bolling v. Sharpe, held federally
imposed racial segregation unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Bolling v Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
114
See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 191 (1973) (alleging that
school segregation was imposed through “the manipulation of student attendance
zones, schoolsite selection and a neighborhood school policy”).
115
See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 490–92.
116
NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1045 (6th Cir. 1977) (quoting
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)). While Brown I declared
segregation unconstitutional, Brown II, decided the following year, dealt with the
issue of remedy. The Court’s decision in Brown II formed the foundation for the
doctrine governing what obligations a district was under to desegregate once it had
been found that the district operated a dual school system. Brown v. Bd. of Educ.
(Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 298–301 (1955).
112
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The Supreme Court articulated the extent of such a district’s
obligation in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education.117 The specific issue in Swann was whether a facially
neutral student assignment system118 that nonetheless resulted
in segregated schools violated the district’s affirmative duty to
desegregate.119 The Court held that the affirmative duty to
desegregate does not require districts to achieve a precise racial
balance.120 However, the Court did caution lower courts to
scrutinize “racially neutral” assignment plans that result in
could
serve
to
segregated schools,121 because such plans
perpetuate segregation through the “discriminatory location of
school sites or [the] distortion of school size in order to achieve or
maintain an artificial racial separation.”122 By acknowledging
that a district’s affirmative duty to desegregate encompasses
more than merely avoiding those laws which explicitly segregate
on their face,123 the Court laid the foundation for what would
become a key distinction: the difference between de jure and de
facto segregation.124
The Court built upon that proposition in Keyes v. School
District No. 1.125
Keyes was distinct from the earlier
desegregation cases in that the district at issue “ha[d] never been
operated under a constitutional or statutory provision that
mandated or permitted racial segregation in public education.”126
Instead, the plaintiffs alleged that the School Board created and
maintained a system of segregation by manipulating “student
attendance zones, schoolsite selection and a neighborhood school
policy.”127
Thus, the Court had to determine whether

117

See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
A student assignment system is the process by which students in a district
are assigned to particular schools. See id. at 28–29.
119
Id. at 22.
120
Id. at 24.
121
Id. at 26.
122
Id. at 28.
123
See id.
124
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
125
See id. at 208–09.
126
Id. at 191.
127
Id. A “neighborhood school policy” is one in which the school district sends
children to schools in their neighborhood. These systems were often manipulated to
maintain segregation by mapping the boundaries of the neighborhood schools along
existing patterns of residential segregation. Id. at 211–12.
118
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manipulation of race-neutral policies in a district that had never
explicitly segregated by law could nonetheless constitute a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.128
In answering that question, the Court articulated the
distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. The Court
defined de jure segregation as “a current condition of segregation
resulting from intentional state action directed specifically [at]
the [segregated] schools”129 and “emphasize[d] that the
differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called
de facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate.”130 An
Equal Protection violation only exists where plaintiffs can
establish that the segregation complained of is the result of de
jure, and not de facto, segregation.131
Plaintiffs bear the initial burden of establishing that the
segregated conditions result from intentional state action132 and
not from actions “which are beyond the control of state
officials.”133 To disprove intent after plaintiffs establish a prima
facie case of de jure segregation,134 it is insufficient for the school
district to merely “rely upon some allegedly logical, racially
neutral explanation.”135 Moreover, a school district may not rely
on the remoteness in time between the intent and the current
existence of segregation.136 Rather, if the district’s actions “were
to any degree motivated by segregative intent and the
segregation resulting from those actions continues to exist, the
fact of remoteness in time certainly does not make those actions
any less ‘intentional.’ ”137 While it is true that eventually “the
relationship between past segregative acts and present
segregation may become [too] attenuated” to support a finding of

128

See id. at 198.
Id. at 205–06.
130
Id. at 208.
131
See Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 45–46 (2d Cir. 1975).
132
See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 198.
133
NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1045 (6th Cir. 1977).
134
In Keyes, the Court acknowledged that “[i]n the context of racial segregation
in public education” there are “a variety of situations in which ‘fairness’ and ‘policy’
require state authorities to bear the burden of explaining actions or conditions which
appear to be racially motivated.” Keyes, 413 U.S. at 209. Thus, in certain situations,
presumptions may provide the requisite prima facie showing of intent. Id. at 208.
135
Id. at 210.
136
Id. (“We reject any suggestion that remoteness in time has any relevance to
the issue of intent.”).
137
Id. at 210–11.
129
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de jure segregation, the Court cautioned that the “connection
between past segregative acts and present segregation may be
present even when not apparent and that close examination is
required before concluding that the connection does not exist.”138
Thus, to rebut a presumption of segregative intent, the district
must either affirmatively disprove that its actions were
motivated by such intent or show “that its past segregative acts
did not create or contribute to the current segregated condition”
of the schools.139 After Keyes, the key issue in any desegregation
case became whether the school authorities acted with the
requisite intent to segregate.
In the immediate wake of Keyes, the circuit courts of appeals
attempted to develop a standard for precisely what a plaintiff
must show in order to establish “intent.” In United States v.
School District of Omaha, the Eighth Circuit provided a
significant clarification of what type of “intent” is segregative in
nature:
[T]he ‘intent’ which triggers a finding of unconstitutionality is
not an intent to harm black students, but simply an intent to
bring about or maintain segregated schools. Thus, even if a
school board believes that ‘separate but equal’ is superior for
black children, that belief will not save the intentional
segregation from a finding of unconstitutionality.140

Thus, the Eighth Circuit made clear that in looking for intent,
courts are not concerned with determining whether a district’s
actions are malevolent or benign; they are interested only in
whether or not intent to segregate motivated a district’s
decision.141
The circuit courts of appeals also began exploring methods
by which such segregative intent could be established. Drawing
on the Supreme Court’s use of presumptions in Keyes,142 a
number of circuit courts of appeals began to articulate a “natural
and foreseeable consequences” presumption. The presumption
originated in Oliver v. Michigan State Board of Education, where
the Sixth Circuit held that a presumption of segregative intent
could be drawn where the plaintiffs can establish that
138
139
140
141
142

Id. at 211.
Id.
United States v. Sch. Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 535 (8th Cir. 1975).
See id.
See supra note 134.
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segregation is “the natural, probable, and foreseeable result of
public officials’ action or inaction.”143 Other circuits soon adopted
the Sixth Circuit’s use of such a presumption.144
However, the use of the “natural and foreseeable
consequences” presumption was quickly called into question in
the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Washington v.
Davis.145 There, the Court held that to establish the requisite
intent for an Equal Protection violation where a facially neutral
law is at issue, a plaintiff must do more than demonstrate that
the law has a greater proportionate impact on one race than it
does on another: “Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but
it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination
forbidden by the Constitution.” 146 The Court also made clear
that its holding applied to school desegregation cases.147
Accordingly, the circuit courts of appeals began considering the
implications of Washington v. Davis on the “natural, probable,
and foreseeable” consequences presumption.148
143

Oliver v. Mich. State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974).
See Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding
that “a finding of de jure segregation may be based on actions taken, coupled with
omissions made, by governmental authorities which have the natural and
foreseeable consequence of causing educational segregation”); see also Sch. Dist. of
Omaha, 521 F.2d at 535–36 (holding “that a presumption of segregative intent arises
once it is established that school authorities have engaged in acts or omissions, the
natural, probable and foreseeable consequence of which is to bring about or maintain
segregation”).
145
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232 (1976). At issue in Washington v.
Davis was “a qualifying test administered to applicants for positions as police
officers.” Id.
146
Id. at 242. An allegation of disproportionate impact, without a showing of
discriminatory purpose, constitutes mere de facto segregation. See id. at 240.
Nevertheless, the discriminatory racial purpose need not “be express or appear on
the face of the statute.” Id. at 241. Rather, it will often be necessary to infer such a
purpose “from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that
the law bears more heavily on one race than another.” Id. at 242. Thus, while
disproportionate impact alone will not suffice to establish an Equal Protection
violation, it may, and often will, provide evidence of intent. Id. at 253 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective
evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective
state of mind of the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have intended the
natural consequences of his deeds. This is particularly true in the case of
governmental action which is frequently the product of . . . mixed motivation.”).
147
Id. at 240; see also Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990,
990 (1976) (remanding a school desegregation case from the Fifth Circuit “for
reconsideration in light of Washington v. Davis”).
148
See, e.g., NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1046 (6th Cir.
1977).
144
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For instance, appellants in NAACP v. Lansing Board of
Education claimed that the Supreme Court repudiated the
“natural, probable, and foreseeable” presumption.149 The Sixth
Circuit rejected the appellants’ contention.150 Rather, the Sixth
Circuit explained that use of the presumption is entirely
consistent with the holdings of Keyes and Davis,151 because the
presumption does “not dispense with the requirement that
segregative intent or purpose be proven.”152 It merely permits
the required intent to “be inferred from acts and policies of school
authorities which had the natural and foreseeable effect of
producing segregated schools.”153 The Sixth Circuit interpreted
such an inference to be entirely consistent with the Supreme
Court’s holding in Washington v. Davis that “discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of [the] relevant
facts.”154
The Supreme Court itself reviewed the “foreseeable effects
standard” two years later in two cases decided on the same day:
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick155 and Dayton Board of
Education v. Brinkman (Dayton II).156 In both cases, the Court
affirmed that “proof of foreseeable consequences is one type of
quite relevant evidence of racially discriminatory purpose.”157
The Court did caution that foreseeability alone does not “make[]
out a prima facie case” and will not “routinely shift[] the burden
of persuasion to the defendants.”158 Nevertheless, the Court
endorsed the use of such an inference in appropriate
circumstances159: “Adherence to a particular policy or practice,
‘with full knowledge of the predictable effects of such adherence
upon racial imbalance in a school system is one factor among
many others which may be considered by a court in determining
whether an inference of segregative intent should be drawn.’ ”160
149

Id. at 1047.
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
155
443 U.S. 449, 464–65 (1979).
156
443 U.S. 526, 536 n.9 (1979).
157
Id.; see Columbus Bd. of Educ., 443 U.S. at 464.
158
Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 536 n.9.
159
See id.; Columbus Bd. of Educ., 443 U.S. at 464–65.
160
Columbus Bd. of Educ., 443 U.S. at 465. Other evidence the Supreme Court
considers relevant to intent includes: “[t]he historical background of the
150
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Thus, although the Court emphasized that proof of foreseeability
alone is insufficient,161 it retained the permissible inference of
segregative intent where “the natural, probable, and foreseeable
result of public officials’ action or inaction was an increase or
maintenance of segregation.”162
From these Supreme Court holdings has emerged a coherent
doctrine governing allegations of public school segregation. For
there to be a constitutional remedy, a court must find that the
segregation is the result of de jure, and not de facto,
segregation.163 Plaintiffs bear the initial burden of establishing
discriminatory intent.164 To make out a prima facie case of de
jure segregation, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) action or inaction
by public officials (2) with a segregative purpose (3) which
actually results in increased or continued segregation in the
public schools.”165 The essential differentiating factor between de
jure and de facto segregation is “purpose or intent to
segregate.”166
Plaintiffs need not establish that segregation was the sole
purpose of the state action; they need only show that segregative
intent or purpose “has been a motivating factor in the
decision.”167 Moreover, the segregative purpose need not “be
express or appear on the face of the statute.”168 Rather, it is
permissible to infer such a purpose “from the totality of the
relevant facts.”169 While neither disparate impact nor foreseeable
consequences—nor both—are alone sufficient to establish an

decision . . . particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious
purposes”; “[t]he specific sequence of events leading up [sic] the challenged decision”;
“[d]epartures
from
the
normal
procedural
sequence”;
“[s]ubstantive
departures . . . particularly if the factors usually considered important by the
decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached”; and
“legislative or administrative history.” Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1977). These factors are not “exhaustive,”
however. Id. at 268.
161
See Dayton II, 443 U.S. at 536 n.9.
162
See Alexander v. Youngstown Bd. of Educ., 675 F.2d 787, 793 (6th Cir. 1982).
163
See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209–11 (1973).
164
Id. at 208.
165
NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1046 (6th Cir. 1977); see
Alexander, 675 F.2d at 791.
166
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208.
167
See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–
66 (1977).
168
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
169
Id. at 242.

FINAL_KASTEN

222

12/11/2013 3:42 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:201

Equal Protection violation, they are nonetheless important
considerations from which a court may infer segregative intent.170
Once the plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case of
unconstitutional de jure segregation, the burden shifts to the
defendant to either affirmatively disprove segregative intent or
demonstrate “that its past segregative acts did not create or
contribute to the current segregated condition.”171
2.

The “Importance of Education” Line

At the same time that the school desegregation cases were
developing, the Supreme Court was simultaneously deciding a
second, distinct line of cases alleging Equal Protection violations
in the public schools. These cases were not alleging conditions of
racial segregation; rather, they alleged that various state actions
otherwise impinged a fundamental right or disadvantaged a
suspect class.172 The early cases in this line were based, at least
in part, on the proposition that the Supreme Court’s holding in
Brown I recognized education as a “fundamental right.”173
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
however, the Court rejected the proposition that education is a
“fundamental right.”174 At issue in San Antonio was a schoolfinancing system that plaintiffs alleged deprived those in
relatively poorer school districts of Equal Protection of the
laws.175 The Court analyzed the issue by determining whether
the financing system disadvantaged a suspect class or impinged
a fundamental right.176 The Court answered both questions in
the negative.177

170

See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979).
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 211.
172
See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
173
Id. at 29. There was a great deal of strong language in Brown I that seemed
to support that contention. See Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“In these days, it
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.” (emphasis added)).
174
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 37.
175
Id. at 19–20.
176
Id. at 18.
177
Id.
171
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Although the Court did reaffirm its “historic dedication to
public education”178 and acknowledge “the vital role of education
in a free society,”179 it nevertheless held that “the importance of a
service performed by the State does not determine whether it
must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of examination
under the Equal Protection Clause.”180 Instead, the Court held
that the only relevant determination in deciding whether
education was a fundamental right was “whether there is a right
to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution.”181 The Court answered this question in the
negative, holding that—at least in the context of this case—
education was not a fundamental right.182
The next school Equal Protection case to address the
fundamental right paradigm was Plyler v. Doe.183 The issue in
that case was whether a Texas law barring un-documented
immigrant children from receiving a free public education—when
children who are United States citizens and children who are
legally admitted immigrants were provided such an education—
violated the Equal Protection Clause.184 The Court reaffirmed its
holding in San Antonio that public education is not a
fundamental right, yet the Court also went to great lengths to
emphasize the importance of a public education.185 Because
“education provides the basic tools by which individuals might
lead economically productive lives to the benefit of [the Nation],”
the Court took the position that it “cannot ignore the significant
social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied
the means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social

178

Id. at 30.
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 33.
182
Id. at 36–37. While the Court refused to assign education “fundamental
rights” status in and of itself, it did acknowledge that where a state deprives a child
of educational opportunities and that deprivation, in turn, threatens to deprive that
child of his or her effective exercise of other, recognized fundamental rights, an
Equal Protection violation may exist. Id. at 37 (suggesting that “an interference with
fundamental rights” may arise if a district were to “fail[] to provide each child with
an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process”).
183
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215–17 (1982).
184
Id. at 205.
185
Id. at 221 (explaining that education is not “merely some governmental
‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation”).
179
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order rests.”186
Thus, while public education is not a
“fundamental right,” the total deprivation of a public education
nonetheless presents “recurring constitutional difficulties.”187
Therefore—even in the absence of either a suspect class or a
fundamental right188—the Court found that the nature of the
deprivation189 required application of intermediate scrutiny.190
In Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, however, the
Supreme Court carefully limited its holding in Plyler to the
“unique circumstances” of that case.191 In Kadrmas, plaintiffs
alleged that a state law permitting “some local school boards, but
not others, to assess a fee for transporting pupils between their
homes and the public schools”192 violated Equal Protection.193
The Supreme Court rejected their claim,194 disposing of “the
proposition that education is a ‘fundamental right’ ” or should
otherwise be subjected to heightened scrutiny.195
This line of cases, therefore, follows the typical approach in
most Equal Protection claims.196 The Court first must decide
what level of scrutiny it will apply to the alleged violation at
issue.197 In order for the Court to subject a state classification to
strict scrutiny, either a “suspect class” or a “fundamental right”
must be implicated.198 Otherwise, with very rare exceptions,199
mere rational basis review will be applied.200 Because the
Supreme Court rejected the contention that education is a
186

Id.
See id. at 217, 221.
188
Id. at 223 (“Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class
because their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a
‘constitutional irrelevancy.’ ”).
189
Id. (“[The law at issue] imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of
children not accountable for their disabling status. The stigma of illiteracy will mark
them for the rest of their lives. By denying these children a basic education, we deny
them the ability to live within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose
any realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest way to the
progress of our Nation.”).
190
See id. at 224.
191
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988).
192
Id. at 452.
193
Id. at 455–56.
194
Id. at 452.
195
Id. at 458.
196
See supra Part II.A.
197
See Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 457–58.
198
See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
199
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–18 (1982); see Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 459.
200
See Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 457–58.
187
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“fundamental right,”201 the fact that a discrimination or a
disparate impact occurs in the context of the public schools will
not automatically entitle a plaintiff to strict scrutiny.202 Rather,
courts must address the classification at issue in each individual
case to determine whether it rises to the level of a suspect class
or a classification otherwise deserving of heightened protection.203
3.

Clarifying the Distinction

What should be clear from this discussion is that the above
Supreme Court Equal Protection doctrines govern distinctly
different cases. While the approach taken in San Antonio, Plyler,
and Kadrmas is broadly applicable to a variety of Equal
Protection violations,204 whether based on race or not, the more
specific approach taken in the desegregation cases is applicable
only in those situations where a condition of school segregation is
alleged.205 Because the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown I
declared de jure segregation in public schools per se
unconstitutional, the inquiry in segregation cases focuses not on
levels of scrutiny or fundamental rights, but merely on whether a
condition of unconstitutional de jure segregation exists.206
C.

Equal Protection and Academic Tracking

The Supreme Court has never granted a petition for
certiorari to hear an Equal Protection challenge to the practice of
academic tracking. However, since the Supreme Court’s decision
in Brown I,207 several circuit courts of appeals have had the
opportunity to consider whether academic tracking constitutes
an Equal Protection violation.208 Several legal scholars have also
addressed the issue of academic tracking and proposed solutions
201

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223–24.
203
See generally Kadrmas, 487 U.S. 450 (disparity in school fees); Plyler, 457
U.S. 202 (legal status and education); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. 1
(wealth and education).
204
See generally Kadrmas, 487 U.S. 450 (alleging inequality in school fees);
Plyler, 457 U.S. 202 (alleging discrimination based on legal status); San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. 1 (alleging wealth discrimination).
205
See supra notes 163–71 and accompanying text.
206
See supra Part II.B.1.
207
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
208
See generally Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775
F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1985); McNeal v. Tate Cnty. Sch. Dist., 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir.
1975); Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
202
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to address the legal implications involved.209 Subsection 1
explains the various court decisions on academic tracking, while
Subsection 2 outlines the solutions proposed by various
commentators. Finally, Subsection 3 illustrates why both the
legal and scholarly approaches are insufficient.
1.

Existing Court Decisions on Academic Tracking

The existing approach to deciding academic tracking cases
has by no means been consistent. The earliest circuit to address
tracking was the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Smuck v. Hobson. In that case, the court of appeals upheld a
district court ruling ordering the Washington, D.C. schools to
abolish the practice of academic tracking.210 The district court
drew a distinction between de jure and de facto segregation,211
defining de jure segregation as “segregation specifically
mandated by law or by public policy pursued under color of
law”212 and describing de facto segregation as resulting “from the
action of pupil assignment policies not based on race but upon
social or other conditions for which government cannot be held
responsible.”213 The district court rejected the contention that
ability grouping was a form of de jure racial segregation214 and
analyzed the constitutionality of academic tracking under
rational basis review.215
However, even under this permissive standard, the court
found tracking to be unconstitutional.216 The court acknowledged
the government’s discretion to classify individuals, but asserted
that a government classification can only be upheld where “those
included within or excluded from the respective classes [are]
those for whom the inclusion or exclusion is appropriate.”217
Thus, the court reasoned, “the track system is fatally
defective,”218 not because it purposefully discriminates on the
209

See generally Dickens, supra note 13; Losen, supra note 38; Note, supra note

23.
210

Smuck, 408 F.2d at 189.
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967), aff’d sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
See id. at 512 n.208.
215
Id. at 511.
216
Id. at 513.
217
Id.
218
Id.
211
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basis of race, but “because for many students placement is based
on traits other than those on which the classification purports to
be based.”219
While the district court case in Hobson is perhaps one of the
most cited academic tracking cases, its approach to academic
tracking has not been followed by later courts. Rather, it was the
Fifth Circuit, in McNeal v. Tate County School District, that
developed perhaps the most commonly followed approach.220
Faced with an academic tracking system in a formerly dual
school district, the court held that “[a]bility grouping, like any
other non-racial method of student assignment, is not
constitutionally forbidden.”221 The court expressed concern with
substituting its judgment for that of educators regarding the
advantages and disadvantages of tracking, and therefore decided
that educators “ought to be, and are, free to use such grouping
whenever it does not have a racially discriminatory effect.”222
Even if ability grouping does cause segregation, it “may
nevertheless be permitted in an otherwise unitary system if the
school district can demonstrate that its assignment method is not
based on the present results of past segregation or will remedy
such results through better educational opportunities.”223 Thus,
the Fifth Circuit’s approach permits tracking in any “otherwise
unitary system”—no matter what degree of segregation it
creates—so long as the segregative result is either: (1) not the
result of other de jure segregation; or (2) being used for the
benign purpose of remedying past de jure segregation.224
Since the Fifth Circuit’s decision in McNeal, other circuit
courts of appeals have adopted, and elaborated on, the “McNeal
standard” in academic tracking cases.225 For example, the
219
Id. The court went on to state: “[R]ather than being classified according to
ability to learn, these students are in reality being classified according to their
socioeconomic or racial status, or—more precisely—according to environmental and
psychological factors which have nothing to do with innate ability.” Id. at 514.
220
McNeal v. Tate Cnty. Sch. Dist., 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975).
221
Id. at 1020.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
See id.
225
Ga. State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1414
(11th Cir. 1985) (quoting McNeal, 508 F.2d at 1020) (“This circuit’s precedent
establishes that, despite any resulting numerical racial disproportionality,
achievement grouping is permissible in a school district that has not been declared
fully unitary ‘if the school district can demonstrate that its assignment method is
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Eleventh Circuit makes it even clearer that the “McNeal
standard” will permit any degree of racial segregation caused by
ability grouping so long as one of the two McNeal factors is
met.226 After finding the factors satisfied in that case, the court
nonetheless openly acknowledged that “the racial disparity in the
local defendants’ lower achievement groups is substantial.”227
Despite this significant degree of segregation, the Eleventh
Circuit found that such segregative effects were permissible
because of the district court’s factual finding that “the ability
grouping schemes will remedy the consequences of prior
segregation.”228
The approach taken by the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois in People Who Care v. Rockford Board of
Education229 stands in stark contrast to the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits’ approach. There, the plaintiffs alleged that actions by
their school district, including the implementation of an
academic tracking system, created an unconstitutional condition
of de jure segregation.230
Rather than apply the McNeal
standard, the district court applied the Supreme Court’s school
segregation doctrine.231
Thus, the district court’s inquiry focused on whether “the
governmental authorities created or maintained racial
segregation in the schools” and whether “their actions were
motivated by segregative intent.”232 The court cautioned that
“segregative intent should not be confused with evil motive” and
emphasized that “the required intent is simply the intent to keep
the races separate.”233
The court explained that “conduct
motivated by such intent is actionable even when there is no
not based on the present results of past segregation or will remedy such results
through better educational opportunities.’ ”).
226
See id. at 1414–15.
227
Id. at 1414 n.14.
228
Id. at 1416. The Eleventh Circuit has continued to adhere to the McNeal
standard, reaffirming it as recently as 2007 in its decision in Holton v. City of
Thomasville School District and expressly rejecting the district court’s analysis of
“whether the ability-grouping program was intentionally discriminatory.” Holton v.
City of Thomasville Sch. Dist. (Holton II), 490 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007); see
also Holton v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist. (Holton I), 425 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th
Cir. 2005).
229
851 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
230
Id. at 908, 910, 922–23.
231
See id. at 930–31.
232
Id. at 931.
233
Id. at 932.
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desire to inflict educational harm upon any racial group.”234 In
applying this approach, the district court found that “a pattern of
facts and circumstances occurring over a long period of time
clearly supports a finding of intentional conduct.”235
That
tracking creates intra-school, rather than inter-school
segregation, is of no consequence: Both violate the Constitution
equally.236 In fact, the court observed that “[s]uch internal
segregation may even be more invidious because its effects are
observable to the students every school day.”237
The Seventh Circuit did not review the district court’s
determination of liability.238
It did, however, have the
opportunity to review the district court’s order of remedy in
People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education.239 In dicta from
that opinion, Judge Posner seems to reluctantly agree that, were
tracking “adopted in order to segregate the races,” tracking
would present an Equal Protection violation for which a remedy
would be available.240 Because a constitutional remedy is only
available where de jure segregation has been found,241 the
implication of Judge Posner’s statement is that where tracking is
implemented with a segregative purpose, it would constitute de
jure segregation.242 He therefore implicitly condones the district
court’s reasoning on liability.243
Clearly, the McNeal standard and the approach taken by the
district court in People Who Care represent two distinct methods
of analyzing academic tracking cases. Because the Supreme
234

Id.
Id. Among the “pattern of facts and circumstances” that supported an
inference of segregative intent was the district court’s finding that “tracking of
students by race into various educational programs” occurred in the school district at
issue. Id. at 933.
236
Id. at 917 (“Within school segregation by intentional conduct is the same as
intentional conduct resulting in systemwide segregation. This internal segregation is
unlawful.”); see also Reed v. Rhodes, 607 F.2d 714, 731 (6th Cir. 1979); Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 511–13, 512 n.208 (D.D.C. 1967), aff’d sub nom. Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
237
People Who Care, 851 F. Supp. at 917; see also Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383 F.
Supp. 699, 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d sub nom. Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 512
F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
238
People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 532–33 (7th Cir.
1997).
239
Id.
240
Id. at 536.
241
See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208–09 (1973).
242
See People Who Care, 111 F.3d at 536.
243
However, because that statement was dicta, it is not controlling.
235
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Court itself has never decided the issue, the circuit courts of
appeals remain free to adopt either approach, or to craft a new
solution.
2.

Commentators’ Critiques of Academic Tracking

Several commentators critical of academic tracking have
attempted to develop legal analysis that would require its
discontinued use.244 Such commentators have tended to take
issue with the McNeal standard and to advocate for an analysis
of tracking either as an Equal Protection violation or a violation
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For example, one
commentator “questions the assumptions that underlie judicial
tolerance of tracking.”245 The author criticizes existing legal
approaches, such as the McNeal standard, as granting too much
deference to the expertise of school officials,246 and takes issue
with the “scientific basis” of tracking.247 But rather than ground
his or her legal attack in the Equal Protection Clause, the author
instead argues that “Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provides one vehicle for challenging the widespread use of
tracking.”248 Such a statutory challenge, the author argues,
would require school authorities to “prove the educational
necessity of tracking schemes that have a disproportionate
impact on minorities.”249 A Title VI challenge would not require
the plaintiff to establish intent and would subject tracking
systems to “the kind of heightened scrutiny required by Title VI
disparate impact analysis.”250 In the author’s view, given the
lack of clear evidence demonstrating the benefits of academic
tracking, schools likely would not be able to demonstrate that
tracking is educationally necessary, and tracking would therefore
not sustain a Title VI challenge.251

244

See generally Dickens, supra note 13; Losen, supra note 38; Note, supra note

245

Note, supra note 23, at 1319.
See id. at 1327.
Id.
Id. at 1334 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1340.
Id.

23.
246
247
248
249
250
251
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On the other hand, others argue that academic tracking
presents an Equal Protection violation.252 For example, Angelia
Dickens
argues
that
academic
tracking
should
be
unconstitutional “because education is fundamentally important
and because tracking systems classify students based on race.”253
Dickens suggests that the Court should adopt the “belief in the
fundamentality of education” adopted by Justice Marshall in his
dissent in San Antonio254 and further argues that tracking
constitutes a classification based on race that should be subject to
strict scrutiny.255 Thus, under Dickens’s formulation, a school
district would be required to show that tracking is “narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”256 In the author’s
view, a district will likely not be able to establish a compelling
interest for tracking; and therefore, an Equal Protection
challenge to tracking under her framework for strict scrutiny
analysis would likely succeed.257
3.

Existing Approaches Are Insufficient

Both the existing McNeal standard and the Equal Protection
and statutory challenges proposed by commentators are
insufficient methods for approaching a legal analysis of academic
tracking systems. The approach taken by the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois in People Who Care258 comes far
closer to providing an accurate analysis under existing Supreme
Court precedent, though as will be demonstrated in Part III, a
deeper look into both Supreme Court doctrine and the history of
tracking has even broader implications than the holding in that
case would suggest.
The McNeal standard largely fails to abide by existing
Supreme Court doctrine.259 Where an existing condition of
segregation in violation of the Equal Protection clause is alleged,

252

See, e.g., Dickens, supra note 13, at 482.
Id.
254
Id. at 485.
255
Id. at 500.
256
Id.
257
See id. at 501. But see Losen, supra note 38, at 527–29 (arguing that under a
scrutiny Equal Protection analysis, “only if facially neutral ability grouping practices
achieved nearly total segregation would they trigger strict scrutiny review” and that,
as a result, “most constitutional challenges are unlikely to succeed”).
258
See supra notes 229–37 and accompanying text.
259
See supra notes 163–71 and accompanying text.
253
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the Supreme Court has expressly instructed courts to look for
evidence of segregative intent as the defining characteristic of de
jure segregation.260 Yet the McNeal standard requires courts to
ignore the issue of segregative intent261 and look only to whether
the segregative result is either (1) not the result of other de jure
segregation or (2) being used for the benign purpose of remedying
past de jure segregation.262 By requiring courts to analyze
whether the segregative result is the effect of other, past de jure
segregation, the McNeal standard forces the courts to bypass the
critical question of whether an academic tracking system that
causes segregative effects is itself a method of present-day de
jure segregation that independently violates the Equal Protection
Clause—that is, whether it was instituted with the purpose or
intent to segregate.263 Moreover, the second prong of the McNeal
standard—that an academic tracking system that creates a
segregative result is acceptable so long as it is being used to
remedy past de jure segregation—ignores the central holding of
Brown I, which was that racial segregation, for whatever
purpose, is inherently unequal and therefore per se
unconstitutional.264
The Sixth Circuit put it simply:
“Benevolence of motive does not excuse segregative acts.”265
Similarly, the Title VI remedy suggested by one
commentator, while potentially effective, does not go far enough.
Academic tracking does not merely present a potential violation
of Title VI; it also significantly encroaches on students’ Equal
Protection rights when it is used in a way that creates intraschool segregation.266
While a statutory remedy may

260
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205–06 (1973); see also supra notes
163–71 and accompanying text.
261
Holton II, 490 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Holton I, 425 F.3d
1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 2005).
262
McNeal v. Tate Cnty. Sch. Dist., 508 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1975).
263
See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
264
Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); see also United States v. Sch. Dist. of
Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 535 (8th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he ‘intent’ which triggers a finding of
unconstitutionality is . . . simply an intent to bring about or maintain segregated
schools. Thus, even if a school board believes that ‘separate but equal’ is superior for
black children, that belief will not save the intentional segregation from a finding of
unconstitutionality.”).
265
Oliver v. Mich. State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 183 (6th Cir. 1974).
266
See infra Part III.
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undoubtedly be a useful tool for challenging academic tracking
systems, an unconstitutional violation deserves a constitutionally
guaranteed remedy.
However, the constitutional remedy proposed by Dickens is
not firmly anchored in existing Supreme Court doctrine. While
many legal scholars likely share the author’s sentiment that
“Justice Marshall’s belief in the fundamentality of education is
an idea courts should adopt,”267 that argument is foreclosed by
the Supreme Court’s holding in San Antonio, which by now is
firmly established.268 Perhaps more importantly, however, even
if Dickens’s approach were to succeed, application of strict
scrutiny would still permit academic tracking were the court to
find that it is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.”269 If, on the other hand, academic tracking is analyzed
as—and found to constitute—a form of de jure segregation under
the Supreme Court’s holding in Brown I, it would be per se
unconstitutional.
III. A DIFFERENT APPROACH: ACADEMIC TRACKING AS A DE JURE
METHOD OF INTRA-SCHOOL SEGREGATION
As set forth above, the line of cases from Brown I to
Columbus and Dayton II, long ignored by scholars and courts,
clearly demonstrates that academic tracking systems constitute a
per se violation of Equal Protection270 in all instances where their
use results in within school segregation—not merely in those
individual districts with a history of segregation.271 To make out
267

Dickens, supra note 13, at 485.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973). At this
point, the doctrine is almost forty years old, and has been reaffirmed at least twice
since it was decided. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988);
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
269
Dickens, supra note 13, at 500.
270
The constitutionality of academic tracking systems in exclusively one-race
districts is beyond the scope of this Note. While the pedagogical value of academic
tracking in any school system is questionable at best, the object of this Note is not to
engage in debate over the system’s educational utility. Rather, this Note seeks to
identify the racialized processes through which tracking systems perpetuate intraschool racial segregation, and confines itself to legal analysis of the constitutional
doctrines through which this modern day school segregation may be challenged.
271
“Within school segregation” is defined, for purposes of this Note, as a
condition that exists when the proportion of students of a particular race in a given
academic track or level significantly differs from the proportion of students of that
race within the academic grade. For instance, if, in a particular district, the seventh
grade is comprised of forty percent white students and sixty percent black students,
268
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such a prima facie case, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) action or
inaction by public officials”; “(2) with a segregative purpose”;
“(3) which actually results in increased or continued segregation
in the public schools.”272 The contention that “academic tracking
systems constitute a per se violation of Equal Protection in all
instances where their use results in within school segregation”273
quickly disposes of the third element. By definition, where
tracking systems do not “actually result[] in increased or
continued segregation in the public schools,”274 no per se violation
will be found.
The first element—“action or inaction by public officials”275—
is similarly simple to establish. The decision to use, or to
continue to maintain, a system of academic tracking is
unquestionably an “action or inaction by public officials.”276 The
decision to newly implement an ability grouping system is clearly
an action on the part of the school board. Similarly, whether one
characterizes the continued use of academic tracking as either
“action” or “inaction,” the classification is of no consequence.
This element is satisfied by either “action or inaction by public
officials.”277 Thus, in every instance in which the use of an
academic tracking system results in within school racial
segregation, the first and third elements of a prima facie case of
unconstitutional de jure segregation will be satisfied.
That leaves only the second element, the distinguishing
factor of any de jure segregation claim: “purpose or intent to
segregate.”278 The disparate impact, foreseeable consequences,
and unique racialized history of academic tracking provide ample
evidence of segregative intent. In fact, academic tracking
each academic track should also be comprised of approximately sixty percent black
students and forty percent white students. A significant departure from those
proportions in any level would indicate a segregative tracking system. It is
important to note that this requirement does not violate the Supreme Court’s
holding in Washington v. Davis that mere disproportionate impact is insufficient to
establish a prima facie case of de jure discrimination. This is so because the other
elements of the proposed approach require a finding that segregative intent is
inherent in systems of academic tracking.
272
NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042, 1046 (6th Cir. 1977); see
supra note 172 and accompanying text.
273
See supra text accompanying notes 270–71.
274
Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d at 1046.
275
Id.
276
See id.
277
Id. (emphasis added).
278
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
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systems are so inherently racialized that their very use justifies a
finding of segregative intent.
For any school district to
(1) continue to use a system (2) that was established for the
express purpose of separating students on the basis of race into
distinct and unequal curriculums and (3) which continues to have
a segregative effect is the very definition of de jure segregation.279
To explain this point, it is helpful to go through the analysis step
by step.
First, Columbus held that while neither disparate impact
nor foreseeable consequences are alone sufficient to establish an
Equal Protection violation, they are nonetheless important
considerations from which a court may infer segregative intent.280
In any district where the use of an academic tracking system
creates within school segregation, both factors will inevitably be
present.
With regard to disproportionate impact, the
disproportionate placement of black students in remedial and low
educational tracks has been widely recognized.281 Moreover, the
requirement that an academic tracking system “result in within
school segregation” to be found a per se violation of Equal
Protection ensures that in all cases under this approach, there
will be a disproportionate impact. The very definition of “within
school segregation” adopted by this Note effectually requires that
a disproportionate impact be present.282
Similarly, segregation is a well-known “foreseeable
consequence” of implementing academic tracking systems in
diverse school districts.283 This is even more true of the decision
279
See Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d at 1046 (“A finding of de jure segregation
requires a showing of three elements: (1) action or inaction by public officials
(2) with a segregative purpose (3) which actually results in increased or continued
segregation in the public schools.”). Perhaps this Note’s most controversial
contention is that academic tracking systems are so inherently racialized that, much
like segregation itself, they cannot be used without segregative intent. To put it
another way, there are enough common characteristics between academic tracking
systems in any district where such systems produce racial segregation that “the
totality of the relevant facts” in every such district will always create an inference of
segregative intent. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
280
See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979).
281
See Dickens, supra note 13, at 474; Losen, supra note 38, at 517; Note, supra
note 23, at 1318.
282
See supra note 271.
283
See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 536 (7th Cir.
1997) (“The well-known correlation between race and academic performance makes
tracking, even when implemented in accordance with strictly objective criteria, a
pretty effective segregator.”).
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to continue to use a system of academic tracking once it has been
shown to have a segregative effect. While evidence of the
segregative effect of academic tracking is alone insufficient to
establish that academic tracking systems constitute de jure
segregation,284 a school board certainly cannot be heard to argue
that it did not foresee the segregative effects of its continued use
of academic tracking when segregation has already resulted from
tracking in its district. Again, the requirement that an academic
tracking system “result in within school segregation” to
constitute a per se Equal Protection violation ensures that in all
cases covered by this approach, the district will, at the very least,
be able to foresee the segregative effects of the continued use of
academic tracking. In this way, this approach ensures that every
academic tracking system that constitutes a per se violation will
involve both a disproportionate impact and a foreseeable
segregative consequence.
However, the inference of segregative intent does not rely on
disproportionate impact and foreseeable consequences alone.
Several other factors strongly support an inference of intent or
purpose to segregate.
Perhaps most convincingly, “[t]he
historical background of the decision”285 discloses an express
intent to segregate on the basis of race.286 When academic
tracking was first developed, its use was encouraged “to keep
certain ethnic groups separated from Anglo-Americans in
school.”287 Its purpose went beyond mere separation of the races,
however; its explicit purpose was to prepare students of color for
vocations by tracking them into remedial and vocational classes,
while preparing white students for college by placing them in
college preparatory tracks.288 Thus, the purpose of the initial
tracking systems went beyond the doctrine of “separate but
equal” invalidated in Brown I to establish separate and unequal
educational tracks for black and white students.289

284
285

Columbus Bd. of Educ., 443 U.S. at 464–65.
See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267

(1977).
286
287
288
289

See supra Part I.
Losen, supra note 38, at 520–21.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
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An inference of segregative intent may fairly be drawn from
the continued use of an educational system with such a highly
racialized historical background,290 especially when racially coded
language and racialized notions of ability continue to pervade
detracking discourse today.291
The conveniently timed
resurgence of academic tracking in the immediate post-Brown
years292 further strengthens that inference. Moreover, when one
considers that the same criteria are used to track students today
as were used at its inception, despite the well-documented and
explicitly segregative purpose of the system at that time,293 it
becomes clear that the segregative intent on which tracking
systems were premised has become embedded in the operation of
the system itself.294 Academic tracking was never a facially
neutral practice;295 it was intended to segregate students when it
was first developed, and it continues to segregate students in
schools across the country today.296 Therefore, based on the
above evidence of segregative intent, academic tracking systems
that result in within school segregation constitute per se de jure
segregation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
A finding of de jure segregation imposes upon those districts
that track in violation of Equal Protection the “affirmative duty
‘to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school
system.’ ”297 This analysis enables courts to prohibit further use
of academic tracking systems by school authorities.298 At the
same time, this approach allows the issue of how to restructure
290
See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267. The historical background of a
decision is particularly strong evidence of segregative intent when “it reveals a
series of official actions taken for invidious purposes.” Id.
291
See supra notes 61–70.
292
See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text; see also Vill. of Arlington
Heights, 429 U.S. at 267 (“The specific sequence of events leading up [sic] the
challenged decision also may shed some light on the decisionmaker’s purposes.”).
293
See supra Part I.A.
294
See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 210–11 (1973) (“If the actions of
school authorities were to any degree motivated by segregative intent and the
segregation resulting from those actions continues to exist, the fact of remoteness in
time certainly does not make those actions any less ‘intentional.’ ”).
295
See supra Part I.
296
See supra Part I.
297
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 203 (quoting Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)).
298
See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 111 F.3d 528, 534 (7th Cir.
1997) (“[D]ecrees which prohibit specified conduct are generally preferable to those
that impose affirmative duties.”).
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student placement procedures in the absence of tracking to be
left to the discretion of school authorities, so long as the
procedures adopted are genuinely non-discriminatory.299 In this
way, the approach proposed by this Note maintains educational
flexibility while more closely adhering to Brown I’s central
holding than do current legal analyses of academic tracking
systems.
CONCLUSION
Even if it were a race-neutral practice, academic tracking is
an inappropriate pedagogy in today’s society. Economically
sustainable employment options increasingly require a college
education, and the purpose of secondary education is now,
primarily, to prepare all students to pursue a college education.
In such a climate, an educational method premised on the belief
that only some students should be prepared for post-secondary
education is no longer viable. Thus, academic tracking affects
students well beyond junior high and high school. It impacts
their chances of success in college in a very real way, and for
those students in the lower levels, it substantially limits their
occupational choices and potential for financial mobility. When
the racial effects of academic tracking are taken into account, it
becomes clear that academic tracking perpetuates inequalities.
Such a system not only segregates in violation of Brown I, but it
fails to even meet the basic requirements of Plessy: Academic
tracking sets up separate academic paths that are explicitly
unequal and that lead to unequal life chances. If Equal
Protection is to mean anything to the countless students
currently deprived of a meaningful education, it must mean that
these modern day systems of school segregation cannot be
permitted to persist.

299
See id. at 536 (noting that school authorities are better equipped than courts
to make decisions regarding educational policy). However, if a school district fails in
its affirmative duty to “eliminate . . . all vestiges” of the segregation caused by
tracking practices, the courts may appropriately order further remedies. See Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).

